



The Role of Diasporas in Foreign 
Policy: The Case of Canada
Marketa Geislerova1
Re ecting a subtle but profound shift in recent Canadian foreign policy 
priorities, the tsunami of last year, the chaos in Haiti, the exploding troubles in 
Sudan are not foreign-aid issues for Canada, they are foreign-policy priorities. 
They re ect our demography transformation from predominantly European to 
truly multinational. Problems in India and China and Haiti are our problems 
because India and China are our motherlands.
John Ibbitson (Globe and Mail, 5 August 2005)
Foreign policy is not about loving everyone or even helping everyone. It is not 
about saying a nation cannot do anything, cannot go to war, for example, for fear 
of offending some group within the country or saying that it must do something 
to satisfy another group’s ties to the Old Country. Foreign Policy instead must 
spring from the fundamental bases of a state – its geographical location, its 
history, its form of government, its economic imperatives, its alliances, and yes, 
of course, its people. In other words National Interests are the key.
Jack Granatstein (Canadian Defence 
and Foreign Affairs Institute Conference, October 2005)
Societies around the world are becoming increasingly diverse. The myth of 
an ethnically homogeneous state that dominated international relations in the 
past century has been largely discarded. Propelled by a myriad of causes inclu-
ding, the nature of con icts, environmental degradation and persistent econo-
mic and demographic gaps, people are on the move. While migration has been 
a constant trait of the international system for centuries, what is new today are 
1 Marketa Geislerova is a senior policy analyst at the Policy Research Division at the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Canada. She may be contacted at: 
marketa.geislerova@international.gc.ca. The views expressed in this paper are solely those of 
the author. While some conclusions re ect information obtained in interviews with of cials 
from the Canadian government they do not re ect the positions and policies of the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
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Introduction
Since the events of 11 September 2001 (9/11), it has been argued by some 
scholars that security has become the dominant force in the European Union’s 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) . As a result, there has been an 
active debate on the ‘securitization’ of the new threats, such as refugees and 
migrants (Bigo 1996, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 2001, 2002; Guild 1999, 2002, 
2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004, 2006; Guiraudon 2000, 2003; Huysmans 2000, 
2004) . In this context, ‘securitization’ refers to the theoretical suggestion that 
refugees and migrants are presented as security threats, based on the framework 
by the so-called ‘Copenhagen School’ (Buzan 1991; Buzan et al . 1998; Wćver 
1993, 1995) . This would lead us to hypothesise that an EU competence in 
security areas matters increasingly, and, given the importance of the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, 03/03, and 07/07, EU competences in countering the terrorist 
threat, matter most significantly .
Yet, if one reviews the area of EU counter-terrorism, there are diverging 
opinions as to which extent EU competences matter in the fight against global 
terrorist threats (Reinares, 2000; Dubois, 2002; den Boer & Monar, 2002; 
Guild, 2008; Mitsilegas & Gilmore, 2007; Occhipinti, 2003; Deflem, 2006; 
Bures, 2006, 2008; Gregory, 2005; Zimmermann, 2006; Friedrichs, 2005; den 
Boer, Hillebrand and Nölke, 2008; Müller-Wille, 2008; Spence, 2006; Bossong, 
2008; Kaunert, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2010). On the one hand, the EU has been 
characterised as a ‘paper tiger’ (Bures, 2006, p . 57) and thus an ineffective 
counter-terrorism actor . On the other hand, scholars point out that the EU has 
1 The author would like to ack owledge the financial support of the Intern tional Studies As-
sociation and the University of Salford .
2 Christian Kaunert is a Lecturer at the University of Salford, Editor of the Journal of Contem-
porary European Research (JCER) and a member of the Executive Committee of UACES . He 
ay be reached at: C .Kaunert@salford .ac .uk .
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taken great strides towards increasing integration and encouraging co-operation 
between member-states since 9/11 (Zimmermann, 2006; Kaunert, 2007, 2010) . 
Zimmermann (2006, p . 123) asserted that ‘on 21 September 2001, the Union 
prioritised the fight against terrorism, and accelerated the development and 
implementation of measures deliberated on prior to the events of 9/11 .’ Yet, 
Zimmermann (2006, p . 126) makes an important caveat to all EU action in the 
field of counter-terrorism: ‘[…] the Union does not have a ‘normal’ government 
at the supranational level with all the requisite powers, competences, and hence, 
capabilities of regular government; it is not a federal European state .’ This 
means, a priori, one would not necessarily expect EU institutions to provide 
significant leadership in counter-terrorism .
EU counter-terrorism policy itself has also begun to receive much scholarly 
attention . The Journal of Common Market Studies published a special issue 
on this topic in January 2008 . The introductory article (Edwards and Meyer, 
2008, p .1) suggests that the entire ‘governance of the European Union has been 
changed through its responses to international terrorism .’ However, counter-
terrorism, while clearly one of the most crucial security policy fields within 
the EU, is also one of the most complicated areas in institutional terms and can 
encompass measures across all three pillars prior to the Lisbon Treaty, which 
entered into force on the 01 December 2009 . Therefore, it is important to keep 
in mind the pre-Lisbon cross-pillar character of the EU counter-terrorism policy 
when drawing conclusions on the role of EU institutions from the following 
analysis, as they can only be generalised to the pillar concerned . Despite this 
note of caution, this article suggests that some limited generalisable arguments 
can be made .
In the pre-Lisbon third pillar of the EU, counter-terrorism involved a number 
of criminal justice instruments, of which the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) 
and the EU definition of terrorism are amongst the most important (Kaunert, 
2007, 2010), with a particular emphasis on the European Arrest Warrant, which 
has been the flagship instrument of the EU . Firstly, the EAW abolishes the term 
extradition, and replaces it with the term ‘surrender’ (Douglas-Scott, 2004) . 
The national judicial authorities will be responsible for its enforcement, thus 
virtually excluding political decisions by excluding the national executives 
from the decision-making process (Wagner, 2003a, p .707) . Secondly, the legal 
effect of this measure is subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Justice (Peers, 2001) if member states sign a declaration approving of this . 
The Commission chose to create the arrest warrant by means of a framework 
decision, one of the third pillar instruments introduced by the Treaty of Am-
sterdam, which is binding on the member states as to the result to be achieved, 
leaving national authorities the choice of form and method of transposition 
(Peers, 2001; Wagner, 2003a, 2003b) . Thirdly, the EAW abolishes the principle 
of double criminality for serious offences, (Douglas-Scott, 2004) . Thus, an 
arrest warrant may not be contested on the basis that it is for an activity not 
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criminalised in the surrendering member states . In addition, the arrest warrant 
is applicable to all offences on a list, and not just terrorist offences . This applies 
to 32 different categories of crimes, thus, virtually all crimes apart from petty 
crimes . Examples of these categories of crime are: participation in a criminal 
organisation, terrorism, human trafficking, sexual exploitation of children and 
child pornography, and also corruption, fraud, money laundering, and making 
counterfeit money . The argument of this article is that the Commission has been 
instrumental in persuading EU member states to adopt the EAW, which under 
normal circumstances outside the 9/11 framework, would have been difficult 
to swallow for most member states .
Furthermore, inhibiting the funding for terrorist groups is of particular im-
portance in the fight against international terrorism (Gilmore, 2003); primarily 
dealt with pre-Lisbon first and second pillar instruments in the EU . The Com-
mission has the exclusive right to initiate proposals on terrorist financing with 
regards to first pillar provisions . The article suggests that it used this power 
and successfully persuaded the Council of Ministers and the European Parlia-
ment to approve its proposed laws . In addition, together with fifteen ‘old’ EU 
Member States, it is also a member of the FATF itself . Legislative measures 
with terrorist financing implications include the ‘Protocol to the Convention 
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters’, as well as the so-called ‘second 
anti-money laundering Directive’, and the 2005 ‘third anti-money launder-
ing Directive’ which repealed the previous two directives . In addition, it also 
integrated a number of associated measures aimed at implementing the FATF 
requirements: (1) Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005 on the control of cash enter-
ing or leaving the Community (which implements SR IX on cash couriers); 
(2) Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006 on information on the payer accompanying 
transfers of funds ; and (3) Directive 2007/64/EC on payment services (PSD) 
in the internal market, which provides the legal foundation for the creation of 
an EU-wide single market for payments .
On the other hand, the Council Secretariat was vital in facilitating the trans-
position of the binding resolutions of the UNSC at the EU level . To this purpose 
the Council Secretariat exerts an important role within the intergovernmental 
setting of the Council of Ministers, to be precise in the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) context of the second pillar . One of the cornerstones 
in the fight against terrorist financing is the regime of targeted financial sanc-
tions foreseen by UNSC resolutions . Following the precedent of the UNSC 
Resolution 1267 concerning Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban and 
Associated Individuals and Entities, the EU has adopted and implemented 
an ad hoc set of rules to transpose UNSC Resolution 1373 in the context of 
the second pillar . Since the adoption in 1999 of Resolution 1267, the EU has 
already been applying certain sanctions on Al Qaeda and Taliban suspects in 
accordance with the list drawn up by the UN ‘Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions 
Committee .’ Yet, after 9/11 the implementation of Resolution 1373, whose most 
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important component is the ‘freezing of assets’ provision, required imposing 
freezing measures against whatever terrorist group, not only against Al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban .
The article suggests that, despite the central place EU Member States continue 
to have in the in the policy-making process, EU supranational actors, in particu-
lar the European Commission and the Council Secretariat3 (Christiansen, 2002; 
Kaunert, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2010; Stetter, 2007), have exerted a considerable 
influence in shaping the current design of the EU counter-terrorism policy . Thus, 
the article engages with the arguments made by intergovernmentalists that the 
supranational institutions are ‘late, redundant, futile and even counterproduc-
tive’ (Moravcsik, 1999a, p .270) . This article argues that the Commission and the 
Council Secretariat played a very active and significant role – the role of a supra-
national policy entrepreneur . Admittedly, counter-terrorism is a policy sector in 
which the European institutions have rarely taken the lead, nor consistently been 
active . Yet, increasingly this view has become challenged (Kaunert, 2007, 2009, 
2010) . The argument of this article is to suggest that this signifies a step towards 
increased supranational governance in EU counter-terrorism policy .
The article will proceed in four stages . The first section will provide a brief 
outline of the debate on the political role of the European Commission and 
Council Secretariat as a supranational policy entrepreneur, and the precise 
framework used for this analysis . The second section will analyse the norma-
tive environment which EU decision-makers have been operating in since the 
9/11 attacks . The third section will demonstrate the empirical findings within 
the case study of the EAW . The fourth section will examine the extent to which 
the Commission and the Council Secretariat have been instrumental for the EU 
counter-terrorist financing regime . Finally, the article will conclude that the 
European Commission and the Council Secretariat have been significant in the 
process of European integration in ‘high politics’, which has implications on 
how scholars of the European Union need to conceptualise the powers of this 
supranational institution .
The European Institutions as a Supranational 
Policy Entrepreneur (SPE)?
The debate on supranational policy entrepreneurship falls within the 
dispute between intergovernmentalists (Hoffman, 1966; Moravcsik, 1993), 
3 The Council Secretariat is here assumed to be a supranational institutional actor following the 
interpretation given by Christiansen (2002, p .35) according to which ‘in spite of the official 
nomenclature, the Council Secretariat is clearly an institution, possessing a formal structure 
with a set of internal rules and administrative practices which regulate the work of a body of 
permanent staff . And it is located at the European level, possessing a high degree of institu-
tional autonomy and may therefore be regarded as supranational .’
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supranationalists (Haas, 1958; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997; Stone Sweet 
et al ., 2001), and institutionalists ‘somewhere in between’ (Pollack, 1997, 2003; 
Tallberg, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2008; Beach, 2004, 2005; Kaunert, 2005, 2007, 
2009, 2010) concerning the role of supranational institutions in the process of 
European integration .
This article suggests a framework of supranational policy entrepreneurs 
(SPE), which is often referred to by the academic literature that discusses 
the role of institutions in European integration (Moravcsik, 1999a; Pollack, 
2003; Beach, 2004, 2005; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997; Stone Sweet et 
al ., 2001) . The concept of a political entrepreneur is grounded in the works of 
Kingdon within the context of US politics . Kingdon (1984, p . 173) suggests an 
evolutionary policy-making model starting with the identification of a problem 
(first stream), which is then followed by a search for alternative solutions (sec-
ond stream) and a decision among these alternatives (third stream) . On some 
occasions, a ‘policy window’ opens for the adoption of certain policies . Policy 
entrepreneurs, ‘advocates […] willing to invest their resources – time, reputa-
tion, money’  (ibid, p . 188), stand at this window in order to propose, lobby 
for and sell a policy proposal . Kaunert (2007, 2009) has further extended this 
framework to constructivist insights of norm construction and norm entrepre-
neurship, widely discussed in the international relations literature (Finnemore, 
1996a, 1996b; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) . 
Why is this important? At the political bargaining stage (the politics stream), 
where decisions amongst different alternatives are taken, the EU is dominated 
by member states’ preferences and interests, especially by the Council of 
Ministers in the third pillar decision-making process . In principle, this would 
indicate the benefits of a liberal intergovernmental analysis for the policy area . 
In this view, European integration can best be explained as a series of rational 
choices made by national leaders and dominated by national interests (Moravc-
sik 1998, 1999a, 1999b) . Thus, EU integration occurs due to: (1) a change in 
interests within the member states; or (2) the result of a grand political bargain . 
International institutions are merely there to bolster the credibility of interstate 
commitments (Moravcsik, 1998, p .18) by ensuring that member states keep 
their promises and thus dare to agree to a mutually favourable solution without 
the fear of ‘free-riders .’
But where do member states’ national interests and preferences come 
from? Moravcsik (1998) assumes national interests to be exogenous of the 
EU process . The interests of the member states are stable before they come 
to the bargaining table . However, it does not seem reasonable to assert that 
preferences are exogenous . The EU has created a system whereby member 
states continuously interact at different levels . The claim that this would not 
change preferences over time appears doubtful . Even within the context of the 
international system with less social interaction amongst states, Katzenstein 
(1996) has demonstrated convincingly how norms and values shape national 
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interests . Constructivist literature clearly showed how these norms change over 
time (Finnemore, 1996a, 1996b; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) . 
Yet, if national interests and preferences are shaped by different norms and 
values, as argued in this article, this implies that a fourth stream – the norm 
stream – is underlying the three other streams . Norms consequently influence 
the definition of political problems, the search for policy alternatives, and fi-
nally the national preferences in the politics stream where decisions are taken . 
How can norms be constructed and how can they be observed? Firstly, actors 
provide reasons for action . The SPE constantly pushes for his reasons for action 
to become accepted as a norm, albeit in competition with other actors . This is 
the first stage of norm creation in the norm life cycle as described by Finnemore 
and Sikkink (1998), and is followed by the norm socialisation stage . Eventu-
ally, a norm becomes the dominant norm . Consequently, SPEs are important 
in the social construction and reconstruction of norms that steer the political 
movement of the other streams . 
Kaunert (2007, 2009) suggests the ways in which political entrepreneurs 
can achieve this: 
1 . First mover advantage: SPEs need to come in faster with their proposals 
than their rivals .
2 . Persuasion strategy: as mentioned above, in order to achieve acceptance, 
other actors need to be convinced by the reasons for the action proposed .
3 . Alliances: it is vital for the SPE to form initial alliances with other powerful 
actors to create a bandwagon effect, whereby more actors will join the 
‘winning team .’ 
This article will move from the argument that ‘institutions matter’ (Beach, 
2004, 2005; Bailer, 2004; Elgström and Jönsson, 2000, 2005; Tallberg, 2002, 
2003, 2006, 2008; Lewis, 2005, 2008) . Specifically, it will apply the useful 
model elaborated by Kingdon (1984) as further developed by Kaunert (2007, 
2009) and it also will take into account Lewis’ insights on norms (2005, 2008) . 
In the following section, the role of the Commission and the Council Secretariat 
in the policy-making process of EU counter-terrorism are analysed in detail .
Evaluating the Normative Environment 
after 9/11: The Commission in Action
This section argues that the Commission managed to play the significant 
role of an SPE because it constructed its formal proposals on EU counter-
terrorism within the context of the emerging policy norm of the ‘war on terror .’ 
The proposals, which in its initial state would have been difficult to swallow 
for most member states in the mere context of ‘fight against crime’ even after 
the Tampere Council Summit 1999, were politically constructed to become an 
important instrument in the ‘war on terror .’ In this way, the norm to participate 
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in the war on terror (via EU mechanisms) was used strategically to convince 
the majority of member states of the political merits of increased EU counter-
terrorism cooperation . Thus, the Commission (and the Council Secretariat in 
EU-CTF) managed to play the role of an SPE and persuaded member states to 
promote European integration in EU counter-terrorism .
Put simply, social and legal norms up until the Tampere Council Summit had 
evolved on two axes (Kaunert, 2005): (1) whether the EU should be legislating 
at all in the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ); where the normative 
debate had been structured between those wishing to preserve national sover-
eignty and those wishing to pool sovereignty at the EU level, and (2) what the 
aims and purposes of such a legislation are . This article suggests that regarding 
EU counter-terrorism matters, it is precisely this second dimension that was at 
the heart of the debate . 
Figure 1: September 11 – The EU at a normative crossroads
The Tampere European Council Summit 1999 marked one of the most criti-
cal junctures in the history of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) 
(Occhipinti, 2003) . While the Commission is not widely credited to have set the 
political agenda, it appears to have pushed important elements of its agenda into 
the Tampere conclusions (Occhipinti, p . 82), such as the use of a ‘scoreboard’ 
system (interview CON3, 2004) to monitor a timetable of progress towards 
each of the goals and objectives . This scoreboard was then used throughout 
the five year programme as an instrument to exert pressure on member states if 
progress was lagging behind . However, the Commission also strategically used 
the openness of the Tampere conclusion on counter-terrorism matters in order to 
push for much more significant proposals than member states initially asked for .
The adoption of the principle of mutual recognition of judiciary decisions 
is often seen as the major advance for European integration in criminal justice 
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matters . Wagner (2003b) claims that this principle may play a role ‘similar to 
the 1979 Cassis de Dijon judgment of the European Court of Justice […] which 
paved the way for the internal market .’ In fact, according to Wagner (2003a) 
the Spanish government and the Commission both worked successfully on 
establishing this principle at the EU level, which had already been included in 
a series of Spanish bilateral treaties with Italy, France, the United Kingdom, 
and Belgium . This could be an indicator for Commission influence already at 
this early stage in the member state preference formation . 
September 11, 2001, had a significant impact on the norms of decision-
makers in Europe . In simple terms, there were four general choices of direction 
available to the EU . The first option for EU member states may well have been 
to not join the ‘war on terror’ and continue to operate as before, adhering to 
the traditional principle of national sovereignty . This is represented by the first 
quadrant in the matrix . However, given the still positive state of transatlantic 
relations between Europe and America, this would have necessitated a clear 
rupture in relations . Hence, it was always unlikely to occur . The second op-
tion for EU member states would have been to build a counterweight against 
America’s war and therefore not join in . Yet, in order to realise being a counter-
weight to the USA, the EU would have had to integrate more politically . For 
the same reason as the first option, this was also unlikely to happen . 
This means that the norm to join the ‘war on terror’, which emerged after 
September 11, 2001, would make it difficult not to support the United States . 
The only realistic options at this point in time were Option A and Option B . 
Option A represents what nation states in Europe have traditionally practised 
for a very long time . This implies supporting the United States, while at the 
same time maintaining national sovereignty in the AFSJ . A good example here 
would be the provision of intelligence to the United States government without 
any change of structures in intelligence relations . Option B represents the new 
option for European nation states . It implies full support to the United States 
and its ‘war on terror’, while restructuring the foundations of internal security 
relations in the EU . In essence, as argued in this article, the latter option was 
the one that was pursued by the European Commission and approved by the 
Council .
The political norm that the international community needed to join the war 
against terrorism emerged with the attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 . 
A close examination of the war discourse shows how the norm emerged, and 
ultimately made it difficult to do anything other than join it . This demonstrates the 
fact that, ultimately, the EU had to support the USA – even if more in appearance 
than substance . In fact, the appearance of support would increase peer pressure 
for EU member states to adopt EU counter-terrorism policy in the end .
The platform for the emerging norm to join the ‘war on terrorism’ was first 
established with Bush’s ‘act of war speech’ (BBC News, 12 .09 .01) . In this, he 
declared: ‘The deliberate and deadly attacks, which were carried out yesterday 
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against our country, were more than acts of terror . They were acts of war .’ [ . . .] 
‘This enemy attacked not just our people but all freedom-loving people every-
where in the world .’ [ . . .] ‘We will rally the world .’ [ . . .] ‘This will be a monumental 
struggle of good versus evil, but good will prevail .’ One should note the signifi-
cant pressure for countries to adopt the norm to fight the ‘war on terror .’ Bush 
defined appropriate action in terms of fighting in the ‘war against terrorism’, and 
made an even stronger case by distinguishing between ‘good and evil .’ Later, 
Bush (BBC News, 12 .09 .01) enforced this emerging norm by stating that ‘you are 
either for us or against us .’ Thus, the political pressure is such that the appropriate 
course of action became defined in its support of the US . 
In speaking to the European Parliament, the Commissioner responsible for 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (formerly better known as Justice and 
Home Affairs), Antonio Vitorino, remarked (FT, 06 .12 .01): ‘Terrorist acts are 
committed by international groups with bases in several countries, exploiting 
loopholes in the law created by the geographical limits on investigators and 
often enjoying substantial financial and logistical resources . Terrorists take 
advantage of differences in legal treatment between States, in particular where 
the offence is not treated as such by national law, and that is where we have to 
begin .’ Vitorino made the link that was established earlier very clear . In order 
to combat terrorism, these measures were vital (ibid) . Therefore, in Vitorino’s 
view, anyone opposing these measures behaved out of line, inappropriately, and 
effectively supported terrorism indirectly by not closing the legal loopholes . 
The Commission moved extremely fast to make this link . 
In conclusion, the norms changed demonstrably in the few weeks after 
11 September 2001, and the Commission acted as an SPE in this process . It 
played the role of a strategic ‘first mover’ in order to shape the debate in a way 
that placed the EU at the centre of Europe’s ‘war on terror .’ It also assessed very 
well politically how the norm environment would produce political pressure on 
member states to act . Consequently, the European Commission and its Commis-
sioner Vitorino proposed action which clearly demonstrated its support for the 
United States and its ‘war on terror’ (interviews COM10, COM25 and CON7) . 
The Commission and the 
European Arrest Warrant
In the case of the European Arrest Warrant, the Commission followed this 
normative change in the political environment up politically with a very timely 
proposal . This proposal for the policy had already been under preparation for 
about two years before it was launched . Vitorino initially intended to launch 
it under the Spanish Presidency in the first half of 2002 due to Spain’s strong 
support of the issue in order to solve its own problems with the ETA terrorists . 
Yet, with the emerging norm of the ‘war on terror’, it became apparent that fast 
action was required . Ministers in the AFSJ would be under intense pressure 
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to behave appropriately and settle their differences . Vitorino remarked: ‘If we 
do not get agreement, and it should be a substantial agreement to cope with 
the global threat, it will be difficult to explain to the public why we failed .’ 
(FT, 06 .12 .01) 
Therefore, the Commission’s strategy was for the arrest warrant to be pre-
sented as an anti-terrorist measure and to be amalgamated with other such 
measures, such as the Framework Decision on the Definition on Terrorism . Dur-
ing research interviews, this strategy could be triangulated from the information 
provided by the interviewees, as follows: Firstly, officials in the Commission 
(COM10, COM14, COM20, and COM25) confirmed the political decision 
to bring the proposal of the EAW forward, as indicated above . Officials in 
the Directorate-General JHA under Sir Adrian Fortescue had to work at full 
speed over the weekend before the proposal for it to be approved by the Col-
lege of Commissioners on 19 September 2001 (Occhipinti, 2003, p . 149; also 
confirmed by interviews COM10 & COM25) . The timing was crucial in order 
to construct the EU response to the ‘war on terror .’ 
Secondly, the official who drafted the proposal (interview COM20) con-
firmed the fact that there had been work on it for almost two years, which 
included bilateral meetings with the different member states, with national 
lawyers, academics and NGOs . Nonetheless, all these meetings made it very 
clear that the different national views were very, very far apart . These disagree-
ments covered the most basic features of the EAW, including the maintenance 
of the principle of double criminality, the preservation of some political inter-
ference and even the choice of the legal instrument . All national representatives 
(interviews PR1 to PR24) had serious misgivings about the drafts of the EAW . 
This number is far larger than was commonly suggested by the reporting media, 
who mainly pointed to Italy . However, it seems clear that France, Ireland, the 
UK, Luxembourg, and even the Presidency at the time - Belgium - had severe 
political problems with significant parts of the draft . In the end, the Commission 
made the political decision to have a completely new extradition system and to 
convince member states through constructing the EAW into the ‘war on terror .’
Thirdly, Commission officials accepted the fact that the speed of the nego-
tiations was ‘revolutionary’ (interview COM10 in particular, but also COM20) . 
This is perceived to have been in connection with the political mood of min-
isters, who desperately wanted to demonstrate action (COM10), and were 
persuaded by the Commission that the EAW had to be part of an anti-terrorist 
package . Subsequently, the Extraordinary (Emergency) European Council 
held in Brussels on 20/21 September set in motion a series of nine measures 
proposed by the Commission, of which the most notable items were the EAW 
and the definition of terrorism . The displayed the sense of action that national 
ministers wanted . At the same time, it managed to blur the boundaries between 
the different contents – terrorism and crime more generally . The drafters of the 
18 | Christian Kaunert
EAW (interviews COM20 & COM12) accepted this fact . ‘The European Arrest 
Warrant is not a specific instrument to fight terrorism, but to fight crime’ (ibid) . 
The European Arrest Warrant (EAW) was politically adopted by the Laeken 
Council summit on 14-15 December 2001, with the formal legal adoption in 
June 2002 under the Spanish presidency . The first post 09/11-opportunity for 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) ministers to start negotiations on the ambitious 
anti-terrorist agenda in the Council was during its regularly scheduled session 
of 27-28 September 2001 in Brussels . It was of vital importance for the Com-
mission to ensure the support of the six months rotating Presidency of the Coun-
cil for the European arrest warrant . In particular, there is one specific reason 
why the Commission needed to persuade the Belgian Presidency . Not only are 
Presidencies important in their gate-keeping and drafting roles, but the Belgians 
were known to be opposed to the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) before it was 
proposed by the Commission . This is a fact that was not only confirmed by the 
Belgian delegation, but also reiterated by other national delegations (interviews 
PR1, PR3, PR5 and PR8), the Commission (interviews COM10 & COM20), 
and, in particular, staff of the Council Secretariat (interviews CON3 & CON7) . 
The Belgian Justice Ministry was particularly opposed to the EAW (interview 
CON7), and this fact was known to the European Commission before the ne-
gotiations . This was one of the reasons why the Commission initially wanted 
to propose the EAW under the Spanish presidency six months later (interview 
COM12) . In these circumstances, it was a strategic gamble on the fact that it 
would manage to persuade Belgium in order to achieve greater EU integration 
in the area of criminal justice .
In the end, how did the Commission persuade Belgium? Firstly, it exploited 
a split between the (then) Belgian Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt, and his own 
Justice Minister, Marc Verwilghen (interview CON7) . During the preparations 
of the Council agenda, the instructions of the Justice Ministry that were given to 
their staff were aimed to slow down progress in order to prevent the adoption of 
the EAW . In order to solve this potential problem, Vitorino personally intervened 
at the Prime Minister level (interview CON7) . In this struggle, the Prime Minister 
was convinced of the necessity to incorporate the EAW into the anti-terrorist 
agenda in order to advance to the EU’s role in the ‘war on terror .’ It was only this 
direct intervention by the Belgian Prime Minister within his own national delega-
tion that changed the negotiating stance of the Presidency . During the course of 
the negotiations, both the Belgian Presidency and the Council Secretariat greatly 
supported the Commission in its effort to persuade the other reluctant member 
states to adopt the European arrest warrant . This was the essential first stepping 
stone to success for the Commission as a supranational policy entrepreneur .
As part of the strategy to persuade the big member states, the Commission 
lobbied the United States . The Director-General of the Commission, Fortescue 
(European Voice, 27 .09 .01), had been part of an EU delegation meeting with 
Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, in Washington the week after the 
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events of September 11 . As a result of the terror attacks, Fortescue mentioned 
the fact that the EU and the US could be drawn together by co-operating . 
Moreover, a letter (ibid) was sent to Washington asking President Bush how 
the EU could assist America . Bush’s reply in the form of a five-page letter 
angered several member states, but it gave the Commission another reason to 
press for the smooth adoption of its own proposals . Bush provided a long list 
of 47 demands covering judicial and diplomatic co-operation and other issues 
(BBC News, 22 .10 .01) . Extradition processes from the EU to America should 
also be streamlined, the letter requested . Most importantly, the letter asked the 
Union to ease extradition procedures internally . Again, welcome support for the 
Commission’s cause . Leonello Gabrici, the Commission’s Justice and Home 
Affairs spokesman, argued that ‘the things that we are doing against terrorism . . .
will simplify life for the Europeans and make it easier for us to co-operate with 
the United States’ (BBC News, 22 .10 .01) . 
The final part of the Commission strategy involved persuading reluctant 
member states, especially Italy . This was achieved through a re-enforcement of 
the norm to join the ‘war on terrorism’ and by putting considerable peer pres-
sure on Italy from within the Council and the European Council (The Times, 
07 .12 .01) . Italy was the last member state opposed to the European Arrest War-
rant at that time . However, the Commission and its allies amongst the member 
states, especially Belgium, were quick to apply peer pressure on Berlusconi . 
Commissioner Vitorino declared that ‘we cannot be held hostage to Council 
unanimity’ and indicated that the ‘Council might try to proceed without Italy 
by using the option of enhanced co-operation to allow the 14 member states 
to go ahead’ (Occhipinti, 2003, p .171) . Marc Verwilghen - the Belgian Justice 
Minister who initially opposed the EAW - warned Italy that the Laeken meeting 
on December 14-15 would be ‘very difficult’ for Silvio Berlusconi and that his 
behaviour was ‘incomprehensible .’ The German Interior Minister Otto Schily 
also complained that ‘the Italian position is completely unacceptable’ (ibid) . 
In the end, the pressure applied on Berlusconi paid off, and Italy abandoned 
its opposition (Irish Times, 12 .12 .01) . Italy’s official reversal of policy came 
during a visit to Rome on 11 December 2001 by Verhofstadt, the (then) leader 
of the Presidency . However, this section showed how the Commission and 
its ally – the Belgian Presidency – were able to organise pressure by hinting 
exclusion and by applying it in order to push for the Commission’s proposal 
for the European Arrest Warrant . This is the reason why the European Arrest 
Warrant provides an excellent example of the Commission as an effective SPE .
Counter-Terrorism Financing and the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat
This section argues that the Commission and the Council Secretariat man-
aged to play the significant role of SPEs in dimensions of the first and the 
20 | Christian Kaunert
second pre-Lisbon pillar as well . The Council Secretariat and Commission have 
been demonstrably significant in designing and implementing international 
standards for fighting terrorist financing in the most coordinated and effective 
way . The Council Secretariat constructed its influence predominantly within 
the intergovernmental context of implementing UN resolutions through the 
Council of Ministers, whereas the Commission played a significant role regard-
ing supranational cooperation in relation to FATF recommendations . 
Yet, the implementation of these international standards, framed in the 
context of the UN and the FATF, necessitates clear pooling of national sover-
eignty at the EU level . Surprisingly, EU Member States, despite their traditional 
reluctance to hand over powers to European institutions in areas as deeply 
entrenched in national sovereignty as counter-terrorism, recognised that a col-
lective implementation at EU level can add value in dealing with that demand 
more effectively (interview CON5) . Furthermore, two additional factors added 
to this perception of a European added value . On the one hand, some national 
governments, some which were not previously familiar with terrorism, lacked 
the original primary legislation necessary to adopt some of the instruments to 
implement the provisions (ibid) . On the other hand, the EU had consistently 
been committed in the past to aligning itself to FATF and UN decisions, as well 
as implementing both UNSC resolutions and FATF recommendations into EU 
legislation . Both of these reasons contributed to the EU as a whole seeking to 
be ‘an exemplary implementer’ (Eling, 2006) .
Thus, the Commission and the Council Secretariat both managed to play the 
role of an SPE and persuaded member states to promote European integration 
in countering terrorism financing matters . The use of the term ‘persuasion’ 
here is applied slightly differently to both EU institutions . While the Commis-
sion had to persuade Member States of the merits of the policy, the Council 
Secretariat acted more as a facilitator, given that UN resolution 1373 is binding 
in international law . However, despite this, Members States were persuaded to 
use the framework of the European Union in order to fulfil their international 
legal obligations, which they could have done at the national level only if they 
so wished . EU commitment in the field was subsequently reinforced by the 
shock of the terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004 . The ‘solidarity’ 
Declaration on Combating Terrorism of 29 March 2004, agreed upon by the 
European Heads of State and Government (European Council 2004), again 
strongly emphasised the need ‘to reduce the access of terrorists to financial 
and other economic resources’ and ‘to address the factors contributing to the 
support for and recruitment into terrorism .’ 
The European Commission managed to play the significant role of an SPE 
in the first pillar area of implementing the FATF Special Recommendations at 
EU level . It persuaded EU member states to promote European cooperation in 
the field of countering terrorist financing, where EU engagement was so far 
rather limited, and thereby it contributed to shape the current design of EU-CTF 
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regime . Indeed, the FATF Nine Special Recommendations require the extension 
of the EU anti-money laundering regulatory framework in order to also include 
the offence of terrorist financing . Given that cooperation at the EU level during 
the 1990s focused more on transnational organised crime rather than on ter-
rorism, those actors in charge with anti-money laundering tasks could broadly 
rely on the experience from that field . 
Especially the Commission utilised its expertise and competence from 
dealing with money-laundering in order to initiate legislation related to ter-
rorist financing . The Commission has the exclusive right to initiate proposals 
on terrorist financing with regards to first pillar provisions linked to financial 
crime . Consequently, it used this power and successfully persuaded the Council 
of Ministers and the European Parliament to approve its proposed laws . In ad-
dition, together with fifteen ‘old’ EU Member States, it is also a member of the 
FATF itself . The Directorate-General of the Commission DG Markt leads the 
European delegation in these negotiations . It seeks to coordinate EU Member 
States as much as possible negotiations start, despite their obvious jealousy to 
protect their national prerogatives .
Since the 2001 attacks, especially in the initial months of major political 
pressure for action, the Commission has been able to accelerate the adoption 
of some legislative measures with terrorist financing implications that were 
already under discussion before 9/11 . Amongst these are included the ‘Protocol 
to the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters’4, which provides 
for the exchange of information between Member States concerning bank ac-
counts held by any person who is subject to criminal investigations . The pro-
tocol represents a considerable improvement of cooperation in the fight against 
economic and financial crime . Furthermore, the Commission pushed also for 
the adoption of the so-called ‘second anti-money laundering Directive’5 . While 
controversial negotiations on the Directive had been ongoing since the summer 
of 1999, the Commission demonstrated particular skill in pushing this initiative 
through the ‘window of opportunity’ (den Boer, 2006) after 9/11 . It used the 
close link between money laundering and terrorist financing in order to push 
the European Parliament to agree on the text already approved by the Council . 
The second anti-money laundering Directive was adopted at the conciliation 
stage in December 2001 and thereby amended the earlier 1991 Directive .
The success of this legislation has clear similarities with the Commission’s 
policy entrepreneurship in the adoption of the European Arrest Warrant . The 
EAW, which in its initial state would have been difficult to swallow for most 
4 Council Act (2001/C 326/01) of 16 October 2001 establishing, in accordance with Article 34 
TEU, the Protocol to the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the 
Member States of the EU, OJ C326, 21 .11 .2001 .
5 Council Directive (2001/97/EC) of 4 December 2001 amending Council Directive 91/308/
EEC on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, 
OJ L344, 28 .12 .2004 .
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member states in the mere context of ‘fight against crime’ that was prevalent in 
the 1990s, was politically constructed to become an important instrument in the 
‘war on terror .’ In the same way, the emerging international norm of joining in 
the ‘war on terror’ made it necessary to adopt the directive to counter-terrorist 
financing, even though it seemed implausible to adopt these instruments in the 
‘fight against money laundering’6 . In this way, the norm to participate in the war 
on terror (via EU mechanisms) was used strategically to convince the majority 
of member states of the political merits of the second anti-money laundering 
directive, and it allowed the Commission to use member states’ peer pressure 
to convince the reluctant member states to participate . Thus, the Commission 
managed to play the role of an SPE and persuaded member states to promote 
European integration in counter-terrorist financing .
This process was pushed even more strongly when, in 2004, the Commis-
sion prepared a far-reaching Communication focused on the prevention of and 
the fight against terrorist financing through measures to improve the exchange 
of information, to strengthen transparency and enhance the traceability of 
financial transactions . Most of the elements included in the Communication 
were inserted also in the 2005 ‘third anti-money laundering Directive’7 which 
repealed the previous two directives . The ‘third directive’ also made the title 
‘terrorist financing’ more explicit, and, once again, reaffirmed the EU objec-
tive to comply with FATF standards . It clearly incorporated most of the latest 
version of the FATF Recommendations (as revised in 2003) into Community 
legislation . 
On the other hand, the Council Secretariat was vital in facilitating the trans-
position of the binding resolutions of the UNSC at the EU level . To this purpose 
the Council Secretariat exerts an important role within the intergovernmental 
setting of the Council of Ministers, to be precise in the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) context of the second pillar . One of the cornerstones 
in the fight against terrorist financing is the regime of targeted financial sanc-
tions foreseen by UNSC resolutions . Following the precedent of the UNSC 
Resolution 1267 concerning Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban and 
Associated Individuals and Entities, the EU has adopted and implemented 
an ad hoc set of rules to transpose UNSC Resolution 1373 in the context of 
the second pillar . Since the adoption in 1999 of Resolution 1267, the EU has 
already been applying certain sanctions on Al Qaeda and Taliban suspects in 
accordance with the list drawn up by the UN ‘Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions 
Committee .’ Yet, after 9/11 the implementation of Resolution 1373, whose most 
important component is the ‘freezing of assets’ provision, required imposing 
6 However, it needs to be remembered that, tied to the end of the cold war and the fear of 
organised crime, the EU was able to adopt money-laundering instruments . In fact, the EU 
adopted its first directive on money-laundering in 1991 .
7 Council Directive (2005/60/EC) of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the finan-
cial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, OJ L309, 25 .11 .2005 .
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freezing measures against whatever terrorist group - and not only against Al 
Qaeda and Taliban .
Consequently, the EU decided to establish its own autonomous system for 
identifying and designating individuals and organisations under suspicion of 
terrorism (but not included under the 1267 sanctions regime) . In order do this 
the Council adopted a Common Position (2001/931/CFSP) on the joint bases of 
Articles 15 and 34 TEU in December 2001 . The Common Position lays clearly 
down the criteria for listing persons, groups or entities suspected of having links 
with terrorism and of being involved in terrorist acts, as well as defining the 
actions that amount to a terrorist act . 
This was complemented by a Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001, adopt-
ed under Articles 60, 301 and 308 TEC, implementing the EC law aspects of the 
foreign policy aspects of the Common Position . The EC Regulation provides for 
the freezing of all funds, other financial assets and economic resources belonging 
to the persons, groups and entities listed in the Common Position and coming 
from outside the EU . Furthermore, all the persons, groups and entities listed in 
the Common Position are subject to enhanced measures taken in the field of 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters . The need to adopt a first pillar 
regulation alongside of a second/third pillar common position was necessitated by 
the fact that an asset freeze represents a hindrance to the Community provision 
for the free movement of capital . This would have been prohibited by EC law 
without this regulation . Thus, with the Common Position and the EC Regulation, 
the EU addressed both foreign policy and criminal law matters .
In charge of the strictly intergovernmental workings concerning the pro-
cedures of listing and de-listing of terrorist suspects is the Council Secretar-
iat-Directorate General E for EU external affairs, which is supported by the 
Commission-DG External Relations . The Council Secretariat has over time 
been acquiring substantial functions in the intergovernmental areas of CFSP . 
This is equally true for some areas of police and criminal justice cooperation; 
EU Member States were reluctant to empowering the Commission in those 
sensitive fields . It is for these reasons that, since 1999, the Council Secretariat 
on behalf of the Council – which decided to rely on it for implementation – has 
taken the lead in implementing UNSC Resolution 1267 and in updating EU 
legislation in accordance with relevant changes to the UN ‘blacklist .’ This 
legacy has clearly influenced the post-9/11 institutional and organisational ar-
rangements chosen for managing the implementation of Resolution 1373 . In 
this area, the Council Secretariat plays a very significant executive role and is 
endowed with the delicate responsibility to assist the ad hoc working group 
created within the Council responsible for managing the EU blacklist . Thus, it 
can be argued that the Council Secretariat managed to play the significant role 
of an SPE through its influence within the intergovernmental context of the 
Council of Ministers; thereby facilitating the promotion of European coopera-
tion in countering terrorist financing . 
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Conclusions
In conclusion, this article demonstrated two points . Firstly, European in-
tegration is possible in areas of ‘high politics’, areas at the very heart of the 
nation state . Despite the central place EU Member States continue to have in 
the policy-making process, EU supranational actors, in particular the Euro-
pean Commission and the Council Secretariat, have played a significant role 
in shaping the current design of the EU counter-terrorism policy . Thus, the 
article refuted arguments made by intergovernmentalists that the supranational 
institutions are ‘late, redundant, futile and even counterproductive’ (Moravcsik, 
1999a, p . 270) . 
The Commission and the Council Secretariat have been very active players 
– exerting the role of a supranational policy entrepreneur . On the normative 
level, the Commission in particular managed to contribute significantly to 
embedding EU countering-terrorism policy into a European policy response 
to the US led ‘war on terror .’ This significantly contributed to member states 
preference building . Consequently, the Commission and the Council Secretariat 
played the role of SPEs, as defined by Kingdon (1984) and further elaborated by 
Kaunert (2007) .This clearly adds to the growing body of literature that suggests 
that European institutions can be important players in Justice and Home Affairs 
areas (Kaunert, 2007, 2009, 2010), as well as in other first pillar areas, such as 
telecommunications (Fuchs, 1994, 1995), equal opportunities (Mazey, 1995), 
and research (Peterson, 1995) . 
However, it needs to be acknowledged that there are limitations to the 
arguments in the article . The Commission and the Council Secretariat have 
acquired the capacity to act as SPEs as demonstrated by the cases in this ar-
ticle . This implies a (potentially) significant role in the legislative process, 
even in institutionally difficult terrain such as counter-terrorism . However, the 
thesis is limited to the legislative process . In opposition to the first pillar, in 
the second and third pillar, the Commission cannot take member states to the 
ECJ for failure to transpose legislation properly or on time as would be the 
case in infringement proceedings under the TEU8 . While the Commission and 
the Council Secretariat can act as SPEs regarding legislative innovation, the 
same does not apply regarding the implementation of EU policy at the national 
level . Thus, despite this increase in supranational governance in EU counter-
terrorism, this process is still ongoing and far from complete . Let’s see where 
this process takes us with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which entered 
into force on the 01 December 2009, as well as the adoption of the Stockholm 
Programme – the work programme for the EU in the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice for the next five years .
8 However, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on the 01 December 2009, the pillar 
structure is abolished; this will eradicate this problem to a very significant extent .
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